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According to this logic, the liberal arts' preoccupation with postmodernism, multiculturalism, and the tenets of tolerance and "cultural relativism" has resulted in a tragic under-emphasis on (or even overt challenge to) the liberal-democratic values it is supposed to instill. Although I will claim that this assault on the academy is grievously unfounded, the debates nonetheless open up an opportunity to discuss a number of complex and contested issues, particularly in our moment of crisis: How is democracy variously defined and with what effect? What do calls for civic responsibility and participation specifically demand of citizens? What form of education do citizens require to fulfil such obligations? To what degree do we need to rethink the category of "citizen," given the globalized context in which we now live? In other words, are we merely citizens of a nation state, or do we require a more cosmopolitan definition of citizenship? To be sure, I do agree with my more conservative interlocutors that it is "now time to teach democracy." Where I depart from their position is around questions of the relationships among democracy, difference, and power-specifically, the university's role in fostering both democratic participation and economic justice. Whereas, for example, conservatives like Diane Ravitch and Lynne Cheney argue that "multiculturalism" has gone too far, I counter that it hasn't gone nearly far enough.
My purposes in this essay, then, are essentially threefold. First, in the most immediate sense, I want to challenge the aforementioned attacks against the university in the wake of the terrorist atrocities of September 2001. In the popular press, opprobrium has been near universal; charges ranging from moral equivocation to overt anti-Americanism, even proterrorist sympathizing have been hurled at college campuses from across the ideological spectrum. In an effort to silence the alleged infamy of those faculty and students who have raised questions about, for example, the integrity of U.S. foreign policy and the wisdom of another military campaign in the Middle East, the cadre of forces united against the "unpatriotic academy" have argued, in a rhetorical slight of hand that would have astounded George Orwell, that now is the time for universities to teach the achievements of Western democracy and not "blame America first" for evils perpetuated worldwide. But what critics as diverse as Lynne Cheney and Todd Gitlin have in mind, I argue, is a pedagogical imperative that more resembles a sacrosanct tribute to American democracy realized than one that creates the conditions for the ongoing political activity of confrontation, dialogue, and dissent central to democratization, by which I mean democracy as an ongoing project, always and necessarily unrealizable.
1 Second, given this state of affairs, I want to argue that the prevailing campus McCarthyism-which understands itself to be in the service of, what we might call for lack of less paradoxical vocabulary, "a militarily secure democracy"-is, rather, a symptom of the crisis of political democracy itself. By "crisis" I mean the redoubled efforts to depoliticize-to militarize and privatize-both public space and public time, as well as the proliferating attacks on difference that have been ongoing for decades but that have accelerated in the current unstable climate. Finally, in an effort to deepen and extend a conversation about what the university's responsibility to the institution and perpetuation of political democracy might entail, I offer, in an incomplete and tentative way given the enormity of the task at hand, a series of principles that seem to me an essential part of university education-should it survive-in the new globalized, downsized, neoliberal, post-9fll world order.
Before turning to the multiple theoretical concerns underlying any claim to "education for democracy," I want to address this question "from the ground," so to speak, by narrating my own experience of teaching in the days following the terrorist attacks. There is little doubt that my pedagogical intervention in the post-9fll classroom would be perceived as problematic (even heretical) by the Diane Ravitches of the world, so I offer these reflections as "Exhibit A" and leave it to judicious readers to determine what would be lost if we were to abandon our critical capacities to engage in the most rigorous, scholarly way we know the most pressing concerns of our time.
Teaching in the Post-9/tt University On an unseasonably warm Monday morning in mid-November, almost two months to the day after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, I walked to my class filled with apprehension. I was teaching a senior-level American studies course entitled "Hollywood and the Culture of Violence." The principal goal of the course was to expand students' critical vocabulary and complicate their social understanding of the category of violence itself so that, for example, in addition to more routine examinations of violence and individual behavior, we might address representational violence or the violence of an everconsolidating corporate media against a democratic social order, the workings of"the culture industry," and the complex relationship between the mass media and the larger society in which it is situated. Toward this end, we examined a variety of theories of the relationship between jac Hollywood (and the mass media more generally) and violence from fields as diverse as literature, film, sociology, education, women's studies, and philosophy-an inquiry panning a period of time roughly from the 193Os to the present. That particular morning, the assigned reading was Douglas Kellner's much celebrated and quite controversial study, "Reading the Gulf War: Production/Text/Reception," an excerpt from his 1992 booklength investigation, ThePersian Gulf TV War.In spite of the overwhelming and deeply tragic differences between that military engagement and the present war in Afghanistan, there were elements of the strangely familiar that transcended the obvious-another Bush administration, another Arab nation-and gave me pause. I refer to, for example, the controversy then as now over the Pentagon's tight control over journalistic access to all aspects of the military campaign, the White House's official hard line in painting the war as a conflict (even a "crusade") between freedom-and justice-loving people and "evildoers" who hate what "we" stand for, the climate of rampant anti-Arabism that it perpetuates, and efforts to represent the American public as united against terrorism and in full support of military intervention. To explain my hesitation, and to aid those of you who recall Kellner's thesis only vaguely, let me provide a brief summary of those claims that so powerfully resonate with everyday people's mass-mediated experience of the current war on terrorism, while providing a necessary context for understanding current U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Given President Bush's recent condemnation of Iraq as part of an "Axis of Evil," one of a triumvirate of countries that offer a new stage for u.s. anti-terror operations, critical reflection on U.S.-Iraqi relations over the past decade will no doubt prove timely.
A renowned scholar of postmodem philosophy and culture, media studies, and cultural studies, Kellner examines the Persian Gulf War in the early 19908as both a "cultural-political event" and a military one. One of the most successful public relations campaigns in the history of modem politics, he argues, the war against Iraq "can be read as a text produced by the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and the media which utilized images and discourse of the crisis and then the war to mobilize consent and support for the u.s.military intervention" (199). Kellner reads the Gulf War employing a methodology he calls "multiperspectival cultural studies," which entails examining media representations of the war through the production and political economy of texts, textual analysis and interpretation, and audience reception and use of media culture.
What follows from this multiperspectival approach is a detailed investigation of the process of the production of news and information that includes analysis of news sources-in this case, primarily the Pentagon and the White House. According to Kellner, high Bush Administration officials contacted journalists who would serve as conduits for stories about an alleged Iraqi build-up of over two-hundred thousand troops along the Kuwaiti border threatening to invade the oil-rich kingdom (though satellite photographs purchased by the St. Petersburg Times from ABC, who refused to air them, revealed nothing "to indicate an Iraqi force in Kuwait of even 20 percent the size the administration claimed") and the Iraqi unwillingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the region (though, again, later transcripts of the infamous WilsonHussein meeting failed to support this accusation) (205). In an effort to promote the broader public's total identification with the military point of view, editorial writers and commentators, in tum, used such claims to argue in favor of u.s.military invention as the necessary-and onlyeffective means of response. The Bush Administration was able to further censor and maintain control of the press via the use of a military pool system, which restricted journalists' access to soldiers and the battlefield and thus ensured positive pictures and reporting of the war. Finally, Kellner exposes processes of disinformation and propaganda, such as the invention of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait by the u.s.public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, events that were later (in January of 1992) exposed on ABC's "20/20" as patently false.
Next, Kellner examines the text of the media war: its framing "as a nightly miniseries with dramatic conflict, action and adventure, danger to allied troops and civilians, evil perpetuated by villainous Iraqis, and heroics performed by American military planners, technology, and troops"; the repeated attempts by the media to personalize the crisis by equating Iraq with its leader, Saddam Hussein, who became the sole actor and source of all evil (over 1,170 news articles linked Hussein with Hitler); and the mass hysteria of the American public, whipped up by constant news commentary on the threat of chemical and biological weapons and sudden terrorist attacks-all of which effectively coded the conflict as a Manichean battle between the forces of good and evil and further mobilized support for the war (210). Kellner also notes the frequency of what Edward Said has described as an "Orientalist" mentality in news coverage of the war, citing as a specific example Jim Hoagland, associate editor and chief war correspondent for the Washington Post. Hoagland's pro-war position was based largely on the assumption that Arabs under-jac stand only force and that they are incapable of defending themselves against a much hated dictator (later it would become clear that Hussein's popular support had been greatly underestimated) and therefore cannot solve their own problems without the aid of the U.S. military intervention.
In the post-9fll context, tragically, Hoagland's remarks seem less aberrant than common. Heads of State such as former Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, and any number of White House officials have described the current global crisis in terms of a clash between the "civilized world" and the "uncivilized world," effectively reinscribing the terrorist attack in New York and Washington as a cultural phenomenon rather than a political act.
Finally, Kellner analyzes audience reception of the war in Iraq. Inno way passive spectators of the media war, U.S. citizens were active in both pro-and anti-war demonstrations and organizing. Though the media largely ignored the phenomenon, there was a large anti-war movement in place prior to U.S. military intervention, and the country was deeply divided at the start of the war. Nor did the media cover the intense government harassment, intimidation, and mob violence experienced by Arab-Americans during the "Crisis in the Gulf' and then the war. Not only were Arab-American businesses bombed, but one Arab-American man was beaten in Toledo, a Palestinian family was shot at while riding in their car in Kansas City, and various activists, including Said, received multiple death threats. Additionally, Kellner notes, harassment had intensified to such a degree during the war that "Pan American Airlines actually decided not to allow Arab passengers on their planes!" (218). What the media did focus on was popular support for the war, in particular the fetishism of yellow ribbons, American flags, pro-war demonstrations and chants of "U.S.A.! U.S.A.!" bolstered by the Bush Administration's official line that one was either pro-war and thus a good citizen, or antiwar and thus an unpatriotic sympathizer. Though Kellner voices some alarm at the "quasi-fascist hysteria unleashed by the Gulf War and a disturbing massification of the public," he is careful not to dismiss public support as the effect of so much mystification or latent xenophobia. "Like sports events and rock concerts," he explains, "the prowar demonstrations ... provided the participants with at least a fleeting sense of community, denied them in the privatized temples of consumption, serialized media watching and isolated 'life styles'" (217,220). Participation in an "aesthetic spectacle" of pro-war, patriotic ritual thus enabled citizens-typically alienated, anxiety-ridden, powerless-to feel a sense of belonging and power as members of "the winning team in the Gulf War" (220). In this way, Kellner makes sense of the open expression of intense militarism, racism, and nationalism in terms of individuals' growing sense of isolation, vulnerability, and insecurity and consequently their need to be part of a united and therefore powerful community. Further, it seems to me, the nationalism and racism made visible in the public support of the Iraqi war and currently in the war against terrorism might also be understood as a reaction, in part, to the breakneck globalization of capital and the resulting mass migration and dislocation of whole populations-events that have spawned fear over the loss of cultural identity and 'subsequently calls for the tightening of borders and anti-immigrant legislation. At the local level, the community building after the September 11 attacks can also be read as a response to the forces of deregulation, downsizing, and decline of the welfare state that have resulted in the withering away of public goods and services and the deepening of the public's growing sense of extreme individuation and alienation.
In the comparatively halcyon days of pre-9fll July, making the Kellner selection required reading for a course on media and violence seemed to be a very good idea. Kellner's study of the use and abuse of media in the Gulf War raised fundamental questions about the extent to which corporate and governmental power might encroach on a "free" media, the degree to which we rely on its capacities to be rigorous and critical so that we might effectively fulfil our duties as informed citizens, and the high stakes struggles for such freedoms in times of war given the implicit tensions between democracy and militarism.
Walking to class that November morning, I doubted not so much my convictions but my timing. I had witnessed my students' responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, had sat with them as we watched CNN together, ripped as we had been from the reassuring commonplaces of our everyday lives, of classes and readings and discussions, unable to focus on anything else. "Why us? Why do they hate us?" they demanded. Inthe days immediately following the catastrophe, there were many conflicting answers to this pressing question. Was it a result of U.S. support for antidemocratic regimes in the Middle East? Its occupation in Saudi Arabia? Its near unilateral support of Israel over Palestine? A hatred of American freedoms? A clash of civilzations? A holy war? Now, two months later, I was responding to their confusion and fear-largely undiminished since the attacks due to nightly terrorist alerts punctuated by ongoing discussions of biol ogica Ifchemical/nuclear warfare-not with assurances of a happy ending, the return to life as we knew it, or the promise of a swift jac and just resolution for all. (How could I? How could anybody?) To counter their sense of helplessness, I offered what 1could: an opportunity for them to use their critical capacities to participate in a public political sphere, to doubt, to raise questions, to assent or dissent as their conscience guided them, with the implicit understanding that "no problem is resolved in advance. We have to create the good, under imperfectly known and uncertain conditions" (Castoriadis, "Done" 400) . But while the use of one's reason remains a precondition for agency, it flouts, as Zygmunt Bauman argues, "the desperate human desire for reassurance" (85). On the one hand, the official rhetoric of the White House is better equipped to quench a frightened public's thirst for certainty ("we" are friends; "they" are our enemies), absolute foundations ("we," the good, love freedom and democracy; "they" are evil and hate both), and codes of practice (be patriotic, spend money in New York, defer to military experts, do not ask questions about things you couldn't possibly understand)-far better than the "freedom-cum-uncertainty cocktail served by autonomous reason" (86). On the other hand, doubt can also liberate. Contrary to widespread opinion, doubt may not be the last refuge of postmodemists and other unpatriotic scoundrels, but a condition that, as Ulrich Beck argues "makes everything possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, criticism, morali ty, society, only differently, a few sizes smaller, more preliminary, revisable, and more able to learn" (163).
And there is reason, everywhere, to doubt. The sense of the uncanny that Kellner's analysis invokes is difficult to ignore: the Gulf TV war, itself a bizarre Mobius strip translating simulation into reality and back again, now repeated and doubled in hideous nightmare proportions, a product of Hollywood 's demonic imaginary returned as reality. Only this time we didn't begin with a simulated buildup of troops along the Kuwaiti border, but with the unreal reality offourpassenger airplanes transformed into instruments of apocalyptic destruction, the ruin of lower Manhattan, the savaged building of the Pentagon, the blackened crater in the bucolic farmlands of southern Pennsylvania, the scenes of a makeshift burial ground for some five-thousand innocent civilians. This was no "media event" to be sure. But in the days after the crisis, we would all rely on media to keep us informed. Who has perished? Who has survived? What might we do to help the families of victims? Was it safe to fly? Were we safe in our homes? How were we coping? How was life irrevocably changed? Would we go to war? Would that stop terrorism? Why, why, why did this happen? Needless to say, there is no justification for such horrific devastation; but, at the same time, acknowledging that we have been victims doesn't alleviate the burden placed on us to come to terms with what has happened and the necessity of response, both individually and collectively. Given all that is at stake in an ever-advancing war on terrorism, we cannot divest ourselves of the responsibility to engage in critical examination of the history of U.S.-Arab relations as well as those conditions (historical and political as opposed to simply and irreducibly cultural) that produce terrorists. This responsibility requires, in addition, interrogating how a global media-eontrolled by a handful of multinationals-frames such histories for us, as well as examining the interests and purposes such histories serve. If, as Nick Couldry has recently argued, the events of September 11 can be read as "a violent challenge to a world where symbolic inequality parallels and reinforces other kinds of inequality"-in particular, the extreme unevenness of the word's media operations-then the prevention offuture atrocities demands immediate attention to the possibilities of democratizing the media landscape to create real global dialogue. Yet, I wondered if my students would conceive the assignment as unpatriotic or inflammatory or insensitive. One young woman in class had two brothers-one employed in the World Trade Center and one at the Pentagon-who both were at work the momingof9/11 and who both miraculously survived. Wasitpossiblethat the analysis of the Gulf War as a deeply problematic moment in the history of U.S.-Arab relations could be conceived as offering "justification" for the civilian attack? Would they think I was implicitly suggesting to the family member of two victims of the terrorism that they/we somehow "deserved it" or "had it coming"? My students gave no indication that they read it that way. In contrast to my own dishevelment upon arrival that morning, they were composed, serious, and ready to work. Any worry I had that this was an inopportune or inappropriate time for discussion of events related to the recent trauma they had experienced quickly dissipated. The students seized the opportunity to work through the ocean of conflicting commentaries on the terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan that had washed over them since 9/11. Though the media representation of the Gulf War and America's New War begged many points of comparison, the distinct differences between that historical context and the current one were hardly lost on them. We were the victims of outrageous attack, and they all agreed that no history of bad blood justified the loss of so many thousands of innocent lives. They implicitly understood the distinction between explanation and justification-a distinction apparently lost on jac Senator John McCain, press secretary Ari Fleischer, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and other members of the Bush Administration, who warned Americans that they "must watch what they say" (see Purdum and Mitchell) . And explanation they desperately needed. Having outgrown fairy tales, fantasy, and sci-fi epics of the Star Wars variety, they were dissatisfied with an official rhetoric of good versus evil that neither aided their efforts to achieve a more complex accounting of the global crisis in order to engage it in the interest of a more just and secure future, nor provided them with a language for uniting victims of violence around the world who are forced to live under conditions that undermine their rights, their dignity, and their humanity.
Additionally, students discussed the way the world had changed in the decade since the infamous "television war." From their perspective, the tight control that the elder Bush's administration had on representations of the Gulf War (as articulated by Kellner) was no longer possible in a wired world, in spite of the Pentagon's efforts to manage the public's reception and understanding of the war in Afghanistan. All savvy users of the internet, they had access to a mass of opinion whose ideological range was matched by its geopolitical reach. They knew how to access alternative news sites in the U.S. as easily as they could read the London Times--or, for that matter, leading Arab dailies. Indeed, they were eager to point out that many sites archive international news articles on all events relating to 9/11. Further, perhaps as a result of the controversy that surrounded the Gulf War, mainstream newspapers such as the New York Times self-consciously examined the deepening crisis in Afghanistan from the perspective of a "highly orchestrated communications" event (Becker) . What ensued from that point on were debates about modem warfare as a reasonable and effective response (given the problematic conflation of terror cells with host countries) and about the steps taken by the current administration to curb civil liberties in the name of national security (this was before John Ashcroft's inflammatory and reckless equation of "those who" critique the president's administration with the terrorists themselves). The upshot of their investigations into the Gulf War, and by implication the current war on terrorism, was not a desire to "blame America" or denigrate democratic ideas, but neither was there a desire to resurrect a sacrosanct image of America as blameless. Rather, by recognizing all that was at stake, the exercise encouraged them to take a more active and critical role in their own reception of war information, representations of U.S. foreign relations, national political rhetoric, and the way their understanding of these issues informed their participation in public debates. Further, our discussion provided them with a vocabulary for engaging "the enormous inequality in which voices, and even which regions, contribute to the truly global flows of images and narratives"-a not ineffective point of entry into decades of debate about the global media industry's complicity with forms of cultural imperialism (Couldry) .
So there I was at the end of class doubly vexed. First, having spent the better part of a semester teaching my students to be canny about the ways media manipulate public opinion and manufacture consent, I was the one-not my students-who bought the "official line" about patriotism-at least for a little while. Second, I had really sold my students short. There was no need to defend a critical reading of U.S.-Arab relations against charges of "anti-Americanism"; they understood that political debate is central to the core commitments of a democratic citizenry to shape their own laws and public policy and, when necessary, to change them.
The Weakest Link in the War on Terrorism?
Either you are with us, or you're with the terrorists.
-President George W. Bush
By the time I had returned to my office from class, a friend had e-mailed me a story from the Chronicle of Higher Education. According to the article, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), a conservative academic watchdog group founded by Lynne Cheney, funded a report imperiously titled, Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America and What Can Be Done About It. The authors, Jerry Martin and Anne Neal, proclaim that while citizens across the countryninety-two percent, according to one poll-have rallied behind the president and favor the use of military force against Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, "college and university faculty are the weak link in America's response to the attack," and they name names (1). Immediately, I went to the ACTA Web site and in an absurd moment of presumption and paranoia scoured the list of names for my own. I wasn't there, but there were one-hundred and seventeen names of scholars, students, even a university president singled out for unpatriotic behavior gathered from student newspapers, Web sites, and the media and compiled in a manner reminiscent of McCarthy-era blacklisting. Waging their fingers at an unpatriotic academy overrun by equivocating moral relativists, tolerance-mongering multiculturalists, and left-wing terrorist sym-jac pathizers, the authors excoriate faculty members who "refused to make judgements," "invoked tolerance and diversity as antidotes to evil," and "pointed accusatory fingers, not at the terrorists, but at America itself' (1). Such acrimony aside, most of the statements they cited were innocuous. Consider, for example, Jerry Irish, professor of religious studies at Pomona College, who states, "We have to learn to use courage for peace instead of war." Or Joel Beinin, a professor at Stanford University, who argues, "If Osama bin Laden is confirmed to be behind the attacks, the United States should bring him before an international tribunal on charges of crimes against humanity." Or Todd Gitlin, professor of communications at NYU, who suggests, "There is a lot of skepticism about the administration's policy of going to war" (Martin and Neal 16, 24, 22) . Juxtaposing commentaries provided by scholars who voiced concern over the administration's decision to go to war or who urged a rethinking of U.S. foreign policy with those of president Bush ("In this conflict, there is no neutral ground"), New York mayor Rudi Giuliani ("You're either with civilization or the terrorists"), and leaders ofboth the democratic and republican parties, the authors of the report formulated the following conclusion: "Rarely did professors publicly mention heroism. Rarely did they discuss the difference between good and evil, the nature of Western political order or the virtue of a free society. Indeed, the message of many in academe was clear: BLAME AMERICA FIRST" (7, 11, 3) . Not only does the ACTA report charge the academy with rampant anti-Americanism, but also with creating a climate hostile to students and professors, particularly if they are untenured, who support the war effort in Afghanistan but feel too browbeaten by peacenics to display their patriotism publicly. Only those who oppose the war on terrorism are licensed to voice their opinions and concerns. The fear of reprisal felt by Bush's supporters has, from ACTA's perspective, a chilling effect on "the robust exchange of ideas ... essential to a free society" (Martin and Neal 8) . But their arguments here remain suspect at best. Attempting to appropriate heretofore progressive slogans in this war of position, they suggest that conservative students and faculty are being actively denied their right to dissent, their right to assemble, and their right to free speech. Though government, military and popular support clearly stand in their favor-and no one has posted their names, campus location, and accompanying commentary on the Web--they are nonetheless victims of ruthless intimidation. Further, ACTA claims to support the guarantees of freedom of speech for all, yet it insists that "Academic freedom does not mean freedom from criticism," a warning it directs at those who would question U.S. foreign policy in a time of war (8) . Who is intimidating whom? While we must all acknowledge that the positions we hold bear consequence, it seems that ACTA wants to make sure that those who dissent (I use the word here in its more traditional sense of speaking truth to power as opposed to speaking power's version of truth) feel the real weight of their choices.
ACTA's answer to this apparent campus pandemic of politically correct anti-Americanism is to urge the three thousand trustees at colleges across the country to whom the report was sent to apply pressure to "adopt strong core curricula that include rigorous, broad-based courses on the great works of Western civilization as well as courses on American history, America's founding documents, and America's continuing struggle to extend and defend the principles on which it was founded" (7) . Further, they urge that "If institutions should fail to do so, alumni should protest, donors should fund new programs, and trustees should demand action" (7) . To underscore the significance and urgency of this appeal, they cite support from the White House. Founder of ACTA and Second Lady, Lynne Cheney, argues, At a time of national crisis, we need to encourage the study of our past. Our children and grandchildren-indeed, all of us-need to know the ideas and ideals on which our nation has been built. We need to understand how fortunate we are to live in freedom. We need to understand that living in liberty is such a precious thing that generations of men and women have been willing to sacrifice everything for it. We need to know, in a war, exactly what is at stake. (qtd. in Martin and Neal 7) What such a historical engagement might look like is the subject of her 1995book, Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Stopped Making-Sense and What We Can Do About It. Preeminently an attack on multicultural education in general and national history standards in particular, Cheney's book asserts that such curricula encourage students "to take a benign view of-or totally overlook-the failings of other cultures while being hypercritical of the one in which they live" (26). To cement her case, Cheney argues that as a result of current multiculturalist reforms, students are taught a great deal about the Ku Klux Klan and Senator Joe McCarthy, but little about the scientific and technological achievements of such figures as Alexander Graham Bell, the Wright Brothers, Thomas Edison, Albert Einstein, and Neil Armstrong. The results, for Cheney, are disastrous, as she cites a number of multicultural jac educators whose intentions she describes as building a case against patriotism. In times of peace, multiculturalism produces nothing short of the ideological disuniting of the nation, and in times of global conflict it produces an increased unwillingness to wage all out war. "As American students learn more about the faults of this country and about the virtues of other nations," she argues, "they will be less and less likely to think this country deserves their special support. They will not respond to calls to use American force ... " (29) . Clearly, the exercise of critical selfreflexivity before putting the nation's young men and women in harm's way is not a virtue, according to this logic. I wondered what my students would have done if I'd intervened in our discussion of war and the role of the media in shaping public opinion to remind them of great American contributions to science and technology, of heroes like Alexander Graham Bell and the Wright Brothers.
In an essay that appeared a month after the terrorist attacks, Diane Ravitch echoes Cheney's sentiments and takes the argument a few steps further. She argues that multicultural education not only promotes disunity, but it is dangerous to democracy because it encourages people to think about "our own racial and ethnic differences" and advances not tolerance but a rejection of the common good and the erosion of civil society. Further, she challenges (in a move that suggests a growing irrational, ifnot hysterical, mood) calls to teach tolerance in the aftermath of September 11, "as if our children were somehow responsible for what happened because their teachers had failed to teach them tolerance." It soon becomes clear that what is underlying this querulous logic is the fear of implication, hence her assumption that an effort to accord the attacks some rationality by situating them in a context and to locate the conditions that produce extremism would necessarily lead to a sympathetic identification with terrorists and a justification of their actions. She writes, "Now, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, we hear expressions of cultural relativism when avant-garde thinkers tell us that we must try to understand why the terrorists chose to kill thousands of innocent people, and that we must try to understand why others in the world hate America. Perhaps if we understood why they hate us, then we could accept the blame for their actions" (48). Surely it is possible to condemn terrorism and innocent human suffering and to probe, at the same time, the conditions that gave rise to it. Would it be reasonable, let alone responsible, to call for the eradication of AIDS and then refuse to address those conditions-behavioral as well as economic, cultural, political-that allow the virus to thrive on grounds that we are "blaming the victims"?
The former ethical assertions seem to demand the latter forms of questioning-how would it be possible otherwise to build a future without fear or imminent threat of brute violence or widespread disease? Judith Butler argues that Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and nonviolent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, and to endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds .... Can we hear at once that there were precedents for these events, and to know that it is urgent that we know them, learn from them, alter them, and that the events are not justified by virtue of this history and that the events are not understandable without this history?
It seems, however, that the only social and political conditions for the terrorist atrocities of9/11 that conservatives demonstrate any patience for unearthing are those they shakily connect to "left" intellectual discourses circulating within the university. In the face of this massive threat to Western law and order, it seems, questions of U.S. foreign policy with its near unilateral support. of Israel, its alliances with undemocratic and even despotic governments in exchange for petro-dollars, and its military occupation of holy lands are relegated to the proverbial dustbin of history. Consider, for example, an editorial in the New York Times published on September 22, not two weeks after the attack, by Edward Rothstein. Dismissing what he calls "ideological confections" such as "corporate profit-taking and political power" or worldwide protests against "globalization," Rothstein quickly uncovers the real culprits in the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: postmodemism and postcolonialism. In his analysis, postmodernism is simply a "challenge" to "the assertion that truth and ethical judgment have any objective validity," which apparently denies intellectuals any ethical criteria for evaluating the practices of other cultures, and postcolonialism focuses on "cultures that have experienced Western imperialism" in ways that lay the groundwork for theorizing-and it seems forgiving-all acts of terrorism as simply responses to such imperial behavior. Throwing all scholarly caution and integrity to the wind with such wild reductions, Rothstein concludes: "One can only hope that finally, as the ramifications sinks in [sic] , as it becomes clear how close the attack came to undermining the political, military and financial authority of the United States, the Western relativism of porno and the obsessive focus of poco will be widely seen as ethically perverse. Rigidly applied, they require a form of jac guilty passivity in the face of ruthless and unyielding opposition." Similarly, the Weekly Standard ran an editorial by Waller Newell in late November 2001 entitled, "Postmodern Jihad: What Osama bin Laden Learned from the Left." Like Rothstein, Newell traces-in a bizarre juxtaposition of intellectual traditions-the reigning political ideology of al Qaeda to "European Marxist postmodernism," and in particular to the work of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Franz Fanon, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. Like his U.S. interlocutors, Newell has ratcheted up the rhetorical wattage of his critique of the "liberal" university, assuming, it seems, that such animus provides adequate compensation for his apparent lack of scholarly interest in the actual content of much late-twentieth-century philosophical thought. He charges that postmodernism has "damaged liberal education" in the United States: "Still it doesn't kill people-unlike the deadly postmodernism out there in the world. Heirs to Heidegger and his leftist devotees, the terrorists don't limit themselves to deconstructing texts. They want to deconstruct the West, through acts like those we witnessed on September 11." Feeling, perhaps, that he had let "postmodem" academics off the hook with this last concession, he quickly recovers himself, assuring that "What the terrorists have in common with our armchair nihilists is a belief in the primacy of the radical will, unrestrained by traditional moral teachings such as the requirements of prudence, fairness, and reason." Prudence, fairness and reason, however, read like a hollow banner for conservatives armed with absolutes, consistently brandishing the "you're with us or you're complicit with terrorism" charge like a call to arms in yet another fundamentalist crusade (?).
Finally, the case of the young "American Taliban" John Walker provided conservatives with clear proof that a formal and informal education steeped in "multiculturalism" and "postmodemrelativism" not only incited pathology and violence in the barely civil East, but had profoundly deleterious effects on "our own" naive youth. When CNN's People in the News profiled Walker, it was clear the kid never had a chance. A product of an "open-minded community north of San Francisco" and a child of divorced parents, the teenage Walker, program host Daryn Kagan ominously intones, "immersed himself in rap music, listening to artists like L.L. Cool J. He would often visit hip-hop Web sites, once even posing in an e-mail as an African-American. Identifying with other ethnic groups and cultures would become an important characteristic of John Walker's." Later, we are told that "Walker's father says the turning point may have come when his son read The Autobiog-raphy of Mal colm X" The scene then cuts to Shelby Steele of the Hoover Institute, who theorizes Walker's investment in African American cultural production in the following terms: "The way to be hip, the way to be cool, is to take on a little theme of anti-Americanism, to identify with things from other cultures, to identify with black alienation." Not only does Steele deny the validity of black alienation by reducing it to a form of anti-Americanism, but he also critiques those who are in sympathy with the protest traditions of black Americans-which have historically addressed fundamentally democratic concerns with social justice, racial equality, freedom, and self-determination-as a shortcut to "cool." The political and pedagogical implications ofCNN's carefully crafted packaging of the Walker story are quite clear: learning about and identifying with other (nonwhite) cultural and political traditions is dangerous, while education in "universal" (mainstream, white, American) values and traditions is both patriotic and pure.
Yet, the unwillingness to take up the challenge of what Butler calls a "new order of responsibility" is not only pervasive among conservatives, but among many progressives as well. Consider, for example, the comments of Todd Gitlin in a recent issue of Mother Jones. At first, Gitlin calls for a "reasoned, vigorous examination of U.S. policies, including collusion in the Israeli occupation, sanctions against Iraq, and support of corrupt regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt," as well as "the administration's actions in Afghanistan and American unilateralism." However, in the public debates that followed the tragedy of September 11, Gitlin argues, what we have encountered is not responsible criticism, but so much "leftwing fundamentalism, a negative faith in America the ugly" (22). In a specious distinction reminiscent of Ashcroft's early December 2001 speech before the Senate Judiciary Committee equating dissent with terrorism, Gitlin juxtaposes a kind of "soft anti-Americanism that, whatever takes place in the world, wheels automatically to blame America first" against the "hard anti -Americanism ofbin Laden, the terrorist logic under which, because the United States maintains military bases in the land of the prophet, innocents must be slaughtered and their own temples crushed" (24). Who is being reductive in this instance? While there is no justification for bin Laden's acts of terrorism, the grounds for his actions are not reducible to the u.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia. And Gitlin himselfknows better, given his own insistence that we must rethink U. S.-Arab relations and the current military campaign. Moreover, he offers support for his charges of "soft anti-Americanism" in the form of brief quotations, pulled from their contexts, from Said, Noam Chomsky, and Arundhati Roy--each an acclaimed writer or scholar whose contributions to the study of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can best be measured in years if not decades. That his proofs are feeble or unfair, however, is not really the issue. In a rhetorical slight of hand, Gitlin has successfully encamped the voices of dissent with the actions of terrorists-one big melange of anti-Americanism-and made a mockery of the kind of democratic debate to which he initially appeared to subscribe.
The 1991 Gulf War is not the only occasion for collective deja vu; the current charges of academic anti-Americanism offer yet another blast from the past. The acrimony and venom heaped on the university in the last few months suggest that while much has changed in American life since the catastrophic events of September 11, the debates over liberal arts education-ongoing since the early 1980s-remain unrefreshingly unchanged. To be sure, now indeed is "the time to teach democracy" in American universities. But what does it mean when the "democracy" can be invoked by conservatives to lend credence to the pedagogical dictates of a rigid authoritarianism that pits patriotic, white Americanism against critical multiculturalism? Or against radical educators, who support a form of the education of citizens as citizens who are capable of making their own laws and when necessary changing them. What does it mean when "democracy" becomes so wedded to the dictates of market capital that the university as corporate entity can eschew either political function in pursuit of the logic of pure market? Clearly the crisis of vision and purpose that marks the post-9fll university cannot be separated from the broader crisis of democracy, to which I now want to tum.
The Crisis of the University Is the Crisis of Democracy
In a 1997 essay written just before his death, Cornelius Castoriadis delivers a devastating critique of the current situation of most so-called democracies of the West in which neoliberal social and economic policies were consigning political institutions and political agency to insignificance. "Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as Regime" reveals the vast distance between the governing structures of contemporary u.S. society, what he calls a "procedural democracy," and its ideal of political democracy. In a procedural democracy, citizens are effectively removed from political choice, performing the duties of citizenship such as voting-typically on issues about which they have had little say-once every four years, out of a sense of compulsion or routine. The atrophy of democracy in this sense betokens the ascendancy ofneoliberal social and economic policies "whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximize their personal profit" (McChesney 7). Neoliberalismappears to work best in conditions of procedural democracy, "when the population is diverted from the information, access, and public forums necessary for meaningful participation in decision making" (9). This becomes clear in the current moment of crisis as public discussion about the integrity of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is coded as in sympathy with terrorism by high ranking officials in the Bush Administration. In this instance, the interests of corporate profit and the interests of militarization inform and advance one another.
No longer interpellated as members of a political community at the national or local level, individuals seek affiliation and belonging elsewhere: in family life, in religious or ethnic communities, or through participation in the patriotic aesthetic afforded by popular culture. Bauman argues that as agency gets reduced to making lifestyle decisions, making wise consumer choices, and agonizing over private troubles within the context of neoliberalism, the meaning and experience of "public life" and "public interest" undergo a radical transformation. The public forum, a site where the collectivity discusses and debates those concerns and interests that arise out of the perennial quest for democratic self-governance and its ongoing obligation to transform the present in the service of a more just future, has been replaced by the "talk-show-style surrogate" of the forum, to use Bauman's phrase. He explains:
The public-the gathering of other individuals-can only applaud or whistle, praise or condemn, admire or deride, abet or deter, nudge or nag, incite or dampen; it would never promise to do something that the individual could not do herself or himself, to tackle the problem/or the complaining individual (being but an aggregate of individual agents, the listening/commenting public is not an agency in its own right), to take the responsibility off the individual's shoulders. (65) (66) Without a collective investment in the alleviation of the pain and suffering of its individual members, individuals are made to understand that their burden is theirs alone to endure or not. In this sense, the "public interest" becomes a metaphor for that which titillates and amuses, shocks and frightens, while "the public" plays the role of spectator-eheering or harassing on cue without ever entertaining the notion of intervention. As Bauman's comments make clear, neoliberalism's ongoing efforts to privatize and depolitize the commonweal is not only about privileging the alleged freedoms of every one of its members to pursue their individual jac interests and satisfactions. It is about the loss of political agency and effectivity; it is about dismantling the welfare state and revoking its obligations to make the lot 0 f those pri vate individuals easier to cope with through investment in public education, health care, or adequate housing.
In an era of privitization, Margaret Thatcher once infamously asserted, "there is no such thing as society," only an agglomeration of individuals and their private interests. Moreover, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of last September, citizens racked with fear have assented to the stepped up militarization of daily life and the rolling back of civil liberties in the name of "national security" and at the same time allowed the erosion of their individual and collective capacities to participate actively in democratic life. In a neoliberal era, the "consensus on defence is thus an 'antidote' to the democratic consensus,"making itpossible for governmental powers to "dismiss democracy with the blessing of democracy" (Beck 83) .
How, then, do we revitalize the public sphere under the current aggressive conditions? How do we transform a "procedural" democracy into a substantive democratic "regime" of autonomous individuals living in an autonomous society? How do we challenge the forces of militarization pitted against the civil liberties that vouchsafe our critical capacities as citizens? Obviously, a democratic regime requires individuals capable not only of bringing it into being, but also of making it function and reproducing it. Hence, Castoriadis asserts, "the question of paideia proves ineliminable" (11). A prodigious political educational process, an active paideia, must be committed to developing and exercising all those abilities that democracy requires, so that its claim to autonomy and political equality is "as close to the effective reality of that society as possible" (11). While it is crucial to understand the possibility of a truly democratic paideia as imperiled, and as we take measure of a radically diminished public sphere and the vulnerability of public institutions such higher education, it is equally important to insist that a truly democratic paideia is not yet beyond our grasp.
Castoriadis' distinction between democracy as procedure and regime demands a response to what I would argue is the central issue for scholars in the academy: How does our work encourage or undermine the civic capacities of those we attempt to educate? Jacques Derrida elaborates on this problematic by posing the following questions: "Who are we in the university ... ? What do we represent? Whom do we represent? Are we responsible? For what and to whom? If there is a university responsibility, it at least begins with the moment when a need to hear these questions, to take them upon oneself and respond, is imposed. This imperative for responding is the initial form and minimal requirement ofresponsibility" (3). How we choose to answer these questions has dramatic implications not only in terms of the impact we will have on the fate of the university, but also for the kind of society in which we live. It is a curious contemporary circumstance that many progressive academics will describe their work as political, even radically trans formative , and yet refuse to name, however provisionally, the kind of political regime they hope to put into place, or even acknowledge the ethics that drive their political commitments, alliances, and decisions. Hence, in response to the wartime imperative to "teach democracy now," I want to provide a rationale for the important and necessary use of the democratic imperative to expand individual and collective capacities to self-govern as an ethical referent for what we in the university do. Such a project is necessary not only to defend in the most immediate terms higher education, particularly the humanities, against its ongoing depoliticization and vocationalization, but more crucially to defend it as one of the last public spheres for open dialogue and debate so essential to the ongoing political education of citizens and the revitalization of democracy itself. Defining the university as a vital public sphere requires a commitment not only to technical and professional training, but also to critical and ongoing political education in the service of democratic social relationships and participation in public life. If such participation necessitates public space, "Only the education (paideia) of the citizens as citizens," Castoriadis argues, "can give valuable, substantive content to the 'public space'" ("Greek" 113). Hence, the question of meaningful public space for discussion, debate and compromise-as opposed to the current space of mass mediated schizophrenia promoting a violent juxtaposition of images, from Nike's "Just Do It" campaign to the eerie green night vision of u.s.troops in Afghanistan, from mass advertizing to mass militarization-cannot be separated for the obligations of paideia. And equally important is the creation of a "public time," which Castoriadis defines as "the emergence of a dimension where the collectivity can inspect its own past as the result of its own actions, and where an indeterminate future opens up as domain for its activities" .
The project of engendering a genuinely democratic society and individuals capable of sustaining it is, of course, a fraught proposition in several respects. The initial dilemma concerns the vulnerability and the potential mortality ofa democratic regime (as a regime that functions by virtue of critical reflection and self-government) once citizens effectively subject such institutions to scrutiny, reexamination, critique, and evaluation. Either citizens take part in an alleged form of democracy in which they simply "apply the procedures" in ritual fashion, or they recognize and act upon the need to become self-governing. Accordingly, the civic education of individuals will be dogmatic, authoritarian and passive, or it will be critical-and then, as Castoriadis argues, "the Pandora's box of putting existing institutions into question is opened up and democracy again becomes society's movement of self-institution-that is to say a new type of regime in the full sense of the term" ("Democracy" 10). I highlight the indeterminacy and open-endedness associated with the institution of a regime of political democracy to counter the often repeated warnings voiced by many academics who are critical of appeals to a "modernist" language like democracy as a referent for ethical action. Though certainly there are reasons to be cautious of its utopian elements, I hold that certainty and closure are not necessarily among them.
The risk of the institution of a new type of regime and the demise of democracy is only one problematic. The axiom that an autonomous society must be made up of autonomous individuals (and that individuals can only be autonomous in an autonomous society), accordingly, demands a radical rethinking of political philosophy in general and democratic theory in particular. It requires rejecting the model of the separation between the public and the private domains and recognizing instead their mutual dependence (Bauman 86) . And, relatedly, it means challenging the myth of individualism, the autonomous self who can exist apart from society, as well as reified notions of the social institutions that comprise "the State," which are often conceived in opposition to "the people" rather than constituted by them. The question is how to rethink the crisis of politics and the possibilities for a genuinely democratic paideia in light of these challenges to core assumptions in political theory.
The ancient Greeks made a distinction among three spheres ofhuman activity that the overall institution of society must separate and articulate: the oikos, the agora, and the ekklesia. According Castoriadis' translation, these are the private sphere, the private/public sphere, and the public sphere. The oikos-the family household, the private sphere-is where (at least formally and in principle, Castoriadis reminds us) political power neither can nor should intervene. Ekklesia-the governing body where matters affecting members of the polis are addressed-is the site of effective political power. Traditionally, these have been understood as separate and mutually independent spheres, but, as Bauman rightly argues, it is "rather the link, the mutual dependency, the communication between the two domains which should lie in the centre" of political and specifically democratic theories (86). The third, in-between space, is the agora, which binds the two extremes and holds them together. By focusing on this third sphere of action, Castoriadis develops a theory of social and political organization that at the same time challenges the binary "civil society/State" distinction that has been the hallmark of contemporary political thought (Curtis xi). The agora is crucial to the maintenance of a genuinely democratic regime, of an autonomous polis made up of autonomous members. "Without it," Bauman insists, "neither the polis nor its members could gain, let alone retain, their freedom to decide the meaning of their common good and what [must be] done to attain it" (87).
However there are two ways, Bauman continues, in which the agora may be jeopardized, "its integrity endangered and its role distorted or altogether undermined with the effect of folding back the autonomy of society and of its individual members alike" (87). One is old and familiar: the twentieth century witnessed the rise of several totalitarian regimes worldwide; the totalitarian project seeks the total annihilation of the private sphere, while the public sphere is not at all public in the sense that citizens have little access to it but rather exists as the property of the totalitarian state. The other is quite new and, as I have attempted to show above, is currently unfolding in the contemporary societies of the West, where neoliberal economic and social policies have achieved nearly the reverse phenomenon: the collapse of the public sphere into the private. It is as if, living in the shadow of twentieth-century totalitarianism, Westerners have learned their lessons very thoroughly: state control is corrupt, better to tum everything over to the free market. Address most Americans on the subject and this is likely the response. To the degree that the State is perceived as a threat to personal freedoms rather than a guardian of the public good, the laws of the market supersede the laws of government, and the freedom once vouchsafed as a universal right for all members of society is literally cashed in for the freedom of each individual memberto consume, to make profit, or struggle to survive-alone. With the advent of Reaganism in the 1980s, this anti-statist tendency was exacerbated by a carefully crafted republican rhetoric that linked "big government" with the interests of minorities, women and gays. The increasing marketization and privatization of everyday life has come at the cost of notions of community and the common good. As Bauman insightfully argues, "The 'public' has been emptied of its own separate contents; it has jac been left with no agenda of its own-it is now but an agglomeration of private troubles, worries and problems" (65). In some respects, the attacks of September 11have produced a revival of support for the federal government and with that the construction of a new office of "homeland security." But curiously this office has nothing to do with security in the more mundane "homeland" sense of providingj obs, adequate health care, child care, or a living wage, and everything to do with the security of markets and military might.
Any attempt to recuperate political agency, then, must begin with a profound reorientation of society, with the recapturing of the agora from commercial, financial, and military overuse. "To make the agora fit for autonomous individuals and autonomous society," Bauman asserts, one needs to arrest, simultaneously, its privatization and its depoliticization. One needs to re-establish the translation of the private into the public. One needs to restart (in the agora, not just in ... seminars) the interrupted discourse of the common good-which renders individual autonomy both feasible and worth struggling for. (107) In this way, the agora might become effectively public, "an ekklesia and not an object of private appropriation by particular groups" (Castoriadis, "Done" 407) . The necessary rebuilding of the agora signals a decisive call to action for scholars and intellectuals in and out of the academy if a democratic regime of autonomous individuals is to be realized. Reestablishing the translation of the private into the public, as I've previously suggested, requires a necessary rethinking of the notion of the public, its frequent separation from the private as well as its alleged independence. Nor can we afford in a neoliberal era the traditional liberal assumption that public interests will be attended to by the State and private interests will be addressed by the individual. Against Margaret Thatcher's insistence that "There is no such thing as society," we need to recall "from exile ideas such as the public good, the good society, equity, justice, and so on-such ideas that make no sense unless cared for and cultivated in company with others" (Bauman 8) . By reclaiming the best elements of republicanist and liberal models of the State, of citizenship, and of civic education-taking up the proj ect of autonomy and self-institution as well as a commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms as pedagogical imperatives-it is possible to challenge the disappearance of politics itself. And in this way we can hope to reverse the desperate experience of fear, uncertainty and alienation that accompany the painful erosion of individual and social agency.
Defining the university as an agora, a space of translation, also demands recognition of a fundamental redefinition of the intellectual vocation. And this in tum means rethinking the fashionable dismissal of progressive work in the academy as merely reproducing, through the use of the pedagogue as ethical exemplar, a form ofnormative regulation that serves the interests of the dominant order.
2 If, as Bauman has argued, the university has previously functioned to serve the interests of "nationbuilding, legitimation-seeking powers," the task of intellectuals was to assume the role of custodians and wardens of the rest of the "populationin-need-of-enlightenment-and-cultivation," to serve in the creation, preservation and continuity of "order" by eliciting obedience through a process of Panoptic regulation (99).3However, the present corporate and military powers, having no use for legitimation, no longer require the mediation of missionaries, philosophers, or educators. One has only to consider the recent boom in distance education and the appearance of the "online" university to recognize the effective end of "order" as the primary task of power, to see that such education in this instance is about buying and selling skills on and for the open market.
Rethinking the University as an Agora Once we recognize that we can no longer decry our obligations as civic educators through an outdated appeal to social and moral reproduction, the task at hand is to rethink the universi ty as an agora and to explore what this process of translation requires. What does it mean to rearticulate private concerns and fears as part of the public interest, as public issues for debate and engagement? What does it mean to demand a different order of "security," emphasizing employment, health care, and education, as opposed to the relentlessly militarized version promoted by our national government? How do we invent a language of community or dare to assert a noti on 0 f the pub lie good given their exc 1usi onary legaci es both nationally and globally? What theoretical tools, what language does this require?
To begin, it seems to me, progressives must confront a deeply troubling contradiction governing the relationship between the contemporary academy and the broader society. Consider that within the last two decades, the liberal arts have experienced a boundless proliferation of radical discourses, subfields, and disciplines that seek to theorize the political, to map social identities, relations, and practices and their relations to power. At the same time, those of us in and out of the university have experienced and continue to experience the disappear-jac ance ofpolitics itself," Within the university, encroaching corporatization has produced a more hierarchical institutional arrangement, which has translated into the dramatic limitation of academics' influence over the conditions of their work. Within the broader society, we have witnessed the disappearance of public spaces and public access to the means of mass communication-and with these the decline of meaningful public discussion of issues vital to the health ofa democratic society. As my students proved to me beyond doubt, there are alternative internet spaces for discussions of vital concern to democracy: discussions of breakneck unemployment at a time of record corporate profit that further exacerbate the inequalities between the rich and the poor, of the growing immiseration of the poor and communities of color with the dismantling of welfare, of a prison industrial complex that houses two million inmates and the startling realization that the "land of the free" has become the world's largest jailer, of the ever-expanding militarization of public space and public time. As important as these alternative internet spaces are, citizens' rights to be informed, which is inevitably tied to access to free and independent media, are gravely imperiled by an ever-expanding, global corporate media monopoly whose primary interest is not informing the public but maximizing profit. Moreover, a zeitgeist of fear and anxiety-the result of many factors, to be sure, but topping the list is both the recognition of our collective vulnerability coupled with a real decline in our sense of collective agency-has become widespread, if not terminal. ' At first glance, such a tragic state of affairs might be enough to prove once and for all what a growing number of scholars from across the ideological spectrum have long suspected: that the cultural politics of "race, class, and gender" qualifies as neither scholarship nor as real politics. I point to this contradiction, however, not to denigrate those theoretical discourses that since the 1960s have reinvigorated, at least for a time, a flagging liberal arts curriculum. Rather, I'm suggesting that given the ongoing attacks on the humanities that have been given impetus and urgency by the war on terrorism, we must pose difficult questions to theoretical work that justifies itself as "liberatory," questions that address what it is in its own right, the conditions of its own cultural formation, and how it intervenes in the world. On the one hand, it seems to me that the apparent inability of the new theoretical discourses to revive a waning political culture has little to do with the debates that carry on within English departments and much more to do with events that are largely extra-disciplinary. For example, the increasing corporatization of the university has served either to assimilate the liberal arts to its own interests or to render such disciplines ornamental, if not entirely irrelevant, endeavors. This latter disposition has not only perpetuated the decline of funding from the federal government and granting institutions, but also has led to the diminishing emphasis on liberal arts requirements for undergraduates, the nonrenewal of faculty lines, especially in ethnic and women's studies, and the consolidation, sometimes elimination, of whole departments in classics, romance languages, and the social sciences." On the other hand, it may also be observed that many cultural theorists, while engaging and illuminating in some idealist sense, have little to communicate about the changing institutional conditions that threaten their very existence. As Stuart Hall has forcefully argued, "The state didn't send out the secret police to transform higher education into an entrepreneurial sector; we have done it ourselves by taking on the ethic of the managerialism as the everyday practice of institutional life" (Terry 47 ). Hall's observation demands that progressives rethink how they negotiate their interest in political work in the classroom and in their research, on the one hand, and the dictates of a neutral, nonpolitical "professionalism," on the other, and it demands that they reject the notion that scholarship and commitment are mutually exclusive.'
Of course, the increasingly vituperative attacks on the humanities in light of its alleged "multicultural tum" cannot be reduced to the imperatives of corporatization or the aftershocks of the nation's brutal attack. Rather, I want to reiterate that the increasing attacks on the university and other public spaces are part of a broader attack on the regime of political democracy itself. Such assaults are visible in the increasing militarization of everyday life, including but not limited to the "patriotic" quashing of dissent in the university and the national news media and the revoking of civil liberties in the name of national security; the relentless privatization and depoliticization of the academy and other public spheres; and the proliferating attacks on difference, which range from the rise of religious fundamentalisms to anti-immigration and zero-tolerance policies to antipolitical correctness movements on college campuses.
Further, with the advent of the war against terrorism, the political right has been able to locate an "enemy" as durable as the one it had constructed within national borders. As Beck argues, Enemy stereotypes therefore limit democracy in the double sense that they make it possible to put up fences that must call a halt to all selfevident democratic truths and they legitimate the furnishing and delimi-jae tation of "democracy-free or low-democracy zones." Here, according to established rules, everything can be tried out, planned and implemented which would otherwise be subject to the strictest prohibitions. Examples include: planning and perfecting murder; spending money on horrific weapons systems, the productivity of which "culminates" in their never being used; and many other things.... They [enemy stereotypes] empower the powerful and siphon off the consent to do it from the powerless. (83) The upshot of the newly combined efforts in the war on terrorism-now recombined with the war on drugs and crime-is an antidemocratic and militarized state in which citizens suffer the loss of their rights, freedoms, agency, and security in the name of national safety.
Whatever narrow opening for self-questioning at both the individual and collective level that was created in the brief heyday of critical narratives circulating in the academy is now under assault. In the backlash ofjingoistic patriotism, Christian family values, and zero-tolerance, selfscrutiny, which is the basis of democracy, is as welcome as a spore of anthrax. Absolutism, certainty, and resolution are the orders of the day. Not surprisingly, given these contexts, a commitment to unmasking where and how the politics of race, gender, class or nationality have threatened access to and participation in the democratic life of the nation has won progressive scholars a place in what Richard Rorty infamously referred to as "The Unpatriotic Academy.:" Of course, there is some gain beyond intellectual satisfaction in this kind of analysis, in spite of such railing. But at the same time, those of us involved directly in the production and dissemination of knowledge must be ever critical of our own formations and work. Without question, scholarship over the last three decades has been marked by a vigorous engagement with a variety of radical artistic and intellectual discourses. Such energy is real, and it might have been reassuring "ifwe did not have to remember," as Raymond Williams once cautioned, the "comparable liveliness of Weimar culture in the 1920s ... which, when it came under pressure, was shown to have been all along a double-edged vitality, unified only by its negations, as throughout the whole period of the avantgarde" (Politics 175). Then, the target of Williams , animus was a group of intellectuals invested in a theory of ideology that taught despair and political disarmament in the face of the Thatcherite revolution. Yet, today intellectual history appears to repeat itself as the same kinds of formalist and (simpler) structuralist analyses of corporate-capitalist and bureaucratic societies like the U. S.have degenerated into a similar litany of stark negations-of cultural politics and all manner of institutional work as de facto insignificant or in collusion with domination. Such cynicism is visible in two--only apparently-mutually exclusive gestures. The first is to dismiss the work of critical intellectuals in the university as always already corrupted by their institutional location. The second is to engage oppositional ideas in ways that often reproduce the cult of professionalism and expertise, the historic role of which has been to induce both fear and passivity but also suspicion and anger in professionals in other disciplines. In his history of the American university, The Culture of Professionlism, Burton Bledstein explains:
The university not only segregated ideas from the public, intellectual segregation occurred with the development of each new department in the university. A department emphasized the unique identity of its subject, its special qualities and language, its special distinction as an activity of research and investigation. Any outsider who attempted to pass judgement on an academic discipline ... was acting presumptuously. In order to further their control over a discipline, professionals particularized and proliferated the possibilities for investigation .... The more technical and restricted the individual areas of investigation, the more justifiable it became to deny the public's right to know or understand the professional's mission. My point here is not to denounce complex theoretical work by oppositional intellectuals as such, but to challenge the effectivity of its relentless insularity in the face of massive anti-democratic assaults on the public sphere.
Nor is my point to deny that the marked tendency of the times is-as Manuel Castells, Zygmunt Bauman, and others have observed-the increasing separation of power from politics, in which extant social institutions appear largely incapable of assistance or countersupport to the diminished capacities of democratic institutions in a global neoliberal era. (Bauman 74 ). Bauman's response to these conditions is instructive: it is an insistent demand for more institutional intervention-academic and otherwise-rather than a condemnation of it. As I have already argued, Bauman's response to the decline of political agency in the context of globalization is to thwart the processes of militarization, privitization, and corporatization by struggling over remaining public spaces like the university. It seems to me that precisely because of these unprecedented economic and social changes, the pedagogical dimension of all cultural spheres-inside and outside of official educational institu-jac tions-remains a crucial site of struggle, though it is a struggle that increasingly reflects the dimensions of David and Goliath.
This struggling suggests that progressive educators should promote, at the university level, genuine education over job training, as well as create linkages with alternative sites outside the university in ways that engage the pedagogical force of the entire culture. Ironically, Raymond Williams anticipated the current state of crisis in university education, and in public life more generally, nearly thirty-five years ago. In the preface to the revised edition of his Communications (1966) , Williams accurately predicted the capacities of capital to appropriate the social necessity for what he calls "permanent education" for its own purposes:
The need for permanent education, in our changing society, will be met in one way or another. It is now on the whole being met, though with many valuable exceptions and efforts against the tide, by an integration of this teaching with the priorities and interests of a capitalist society, and of a capitalist society, moreover, which necessarily retains as its central principle (though against powerful pressures, of a democratic kind, from the rest of our social experience) the idea of a few governing, communicating with and teaching the many .... Organized economically, in its largest part, around advertising, it is increasingly organized culturally around the values and habits of that version ofhuman personality, human need and human capacity. This strong and integrated world is capable, I believe, in the coming decades, of adapting to its own purposes both politics and education. (15-16; emphasis added) Williams' concept of permanent education has proven extremely useful in rendering visible the pedagogical force of "our whole social and cultural experience," and it explains his lifelong interest not only in the social function of formal educational structures, but also in "what the whole environment, its institutions and relationships, actively and profoundly teaches" (15). But he grasps something else at least as profound. He recasts the crisis of contemporary life not simply as a crisis of economics, but as a crisis of culture. With uncanny precision, He forecasts the capacity ofneoliberal social and economic policies to instill pedagogically in place of democratic principles of autonomy and social justice those "values and habits" that the market puts into place, the capacity to invest both literally and affectively in what Castoriadis once called the sole grand narrative left-the accumulation of junk and more junk.
Certainly, Williams did not live to see how Francis Fukyama's "end of history" thesis foreshadowed not only the decline of communism, but also the effective end of democracy, to the degree that the latter regime, no longer opposed to the "Evil Empire," became synonymous with the dynamics of capitalism itself. Nor could he have envisioned how the millennial war on terrorism and its "Axis of Evil" have forwarded the cause of neoliberal globalization with minimal public outcry (or even awareness). Yet, Williams' caution that both education and politics could be subsumed by economic forces seems to anticipate the degree to which societies like the United States have since experienced the relentless privitization and denigration of all things public, the vast consolidation of ownership over media communications, and the vocationalization of higher learning. To paraphrase Williams, we now encounter an imperative for job training in the university that would have sounded crude and embarrassing by late-nineteenth-century standards, when something very similar was then proposed. Now, again, it is frequently argued that people must be given skills to earn a decent wage within a post-industrial economy to which they must adapt; as that syllabus is written, as that mandate for university reform rapidly materializes, there is little room envisioned for people who do critical cultural analysis.
Hence, it is the task of radical educators to secure not only a space for free inquiry and dissent--especially in times of global crisis-but also the conditions for their own autonomy within the academy. Williams' insights provide an alternative social vision to progressive scholars and cultural workers caught up in the contradictions between a neoliberal push to depoliticize and corporatize formal educational spaces and a neoconservative pull to use such spaces to reregulate and publicize the most private, intimate concerns of citizens. In contrast to a form of permanent education created by the interests of capital, he proposes an educational vision rooted in the interests of political agency and popular democratic governance:
Against this kind of permanent education, already well organized and visibly extending its methods and its range, an integrated alternative is now profoundly necessary. I have seen something of the plans, in many countries, for a permanent education of a democratic and popular kind: programmes for family care, for the improvement and extension of schools, universities and further education, for the public safeguarding of natural beauty, for the planning of towns and cities around the needs of leisure and learning, for the recovery of control and meaning in work. It is in the spirit of this kind of programme that I discuss communications, jac the field in which one or other version of a permanent education will be decisive. (Communications 16) There is no question, as Williams makes clear, that one form of permanent education will be "decisive." And it is equally apparent that the prospects for instituting a genuinely democratic and popular educational program within the university and all educational institutions-and hence the promise of substantive democracy for future generationsare in crisis.
My intention thus has not been to isolate education as the key to revitalizing a waning political democracy. The assumption that education alone can alter iniquitous social conditions is both unrealistic and naive in that it denies how such institutions are affected by those political and economic conditions that they are allegedly supposed to counter. Rather than offering education as a kind of panacea for contemporary social problems, it seems to me necessary nonetheless in the current state of siege that progressive educators and others address what role the university might playas part of a broader effort to secure the very conditions for democratic participation in public life. In the interest of real homeland security, and as we attempt to open up access to venues for broad public conversation and civic participation, we have to open up rather than close down our classrooms to open dialogue and debate over those contemporary issues and hot-button topics that most concern our students.
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